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FRED LANDMAN
Tel Aviv University
ICEBERG SEMANTICS FOR COUNT NOUNS AND
MASS NOUNS: CLASSIFIERS, MEASURES AND
PORTIONS
ABSTRACT: The background for this paper is the framework
of Boolean semantics for mass and count nouns, and singular and
plural count nouns, as developed from the work of Godehard Link
in Link (1983) (see e.g. the expositions in Landman 1991, 2010).
Link-style Boolean semantics for nouns (here called Moun-
tain semantics) analyzes the oppositions mass-count and singular-
plural in terms of the notion of atomicity: counting is in terms
of singular objects, which are taken to be atoms. Consequently,
Link bases his semantics on two separate Boolean domains: a non-
atomic mass domain and an atomic count domain. Singular count
nouns are interpreted as sets of atoms, and semantic plurality is
closure under sum, so plural objects are sums of atoms.
In this, sorted setup portions - like two portions of soup - are a
puzzle: they are mass stuff - soup -, but count - two. But in order
to be count they must be atoms. But they are not, because they
are just soup. Mountain semantics can deal with portions, but at
a cost.
In the first part of this paper I outline Iceberg semantics, an
alternative to Mountain semantics within the general framework
of Boolean semantics.
Iceberg semantics specifies a compositional mechanism which
associates with the standard denotation of any noun phrase (here
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called the body) a base set, a set that generates the body under the
sum operation ⊔. For count nouns, the base is the set in terms of
which the members of the body are counted and to which distribu-
tion takes place. In Iceberg semantics, what allows counting to be
correct is the requirement on the interpretations of count nouns
that the base of their interpretation is (contextually) disjoint.
Already at this level we see two salient properties of Iceberg
semantics:
- Atoms and atomicity play no role in the theory, so we can
assume an unsorted interpretation domain for mass nouns
and count nouns. In Iceberg semantics, mass and count can
be seen as different perspectives on the same stuff (different
bases for the same body). This means that we can do away
with the extreme body-sorting and body-gridding that atom-
icity entails. With this we allow a simpler and more elegant
analysis of mass-count interactions. For instance, portions
can just be ’mass’ stuff, evaluated relative to a count base.
- The mass-count distinction is formulated in terms of dis-
jointness of the base. Iceberg semantics associates bases not
just with the interpretations of lexical nouns, but with NPs
in general and with DPs. This means that Iceberg semantics
provides a compositional semantic theory of the mass-count
distinction, and hence it provides a framework in which the
mass-count nature of complex NPs and of DPs can be fruit-
fully studied.
It is the analysis of complex NPs and their mass-count prop-
erties that is the focus of the second part of this paper. There I
develop an analysis of English and Dutch pseudo- partitives, in
particular, measure phrases like three liters of wine and classifier
phrases like three glasses of wine. We will study measure inter-
pretations and classifier interpretations of measures and classi-
fiers, and different types of classifier interpretations: container
interpretations, contents interpretations, and - indeed - portion
interpretations. Rothstein (2011) argues that classifier interpreta-
tions (including portion interpretations) of pseudo partitives pat-
tern with count nouns, but that measure interpretations pattern
with mass nouns. I will show that this distinction follows from the
very basic architecture of Iceberg semantics.




I presuppose familiarity with elementary concepts for Boolean algebras,
but give here, for ease of reference and notation, the concepts that play
a central role in this paper.
Interpretation domain:
The semantic interpretation domain is a complete Boolean algebra B
with operations of complete join ⊔ and complete meet ⊓ (operations
mapping subsets of B into B).
Boolean part set: (Small letters: elements of B; Capitals: subsets of B.)
(x] = {b ∈ B: b ⊑ x } The set of all Boolean parts of x
(X] = (⊔X] The set of all Boolean parts of X
Closure under ⊔
*X = {b ∈ B: ∃Y ⊆ X: b = ⊔Y} The set of all sums of elements of X.
X generates Z under ⊔ iff Z ⊆ *X X generates Z under ⊔ if all ele-
ments of Z are sums of elements of X.
Minimal elements and atoms:
min(X) = {x ∈ X: ∀y ∈ X: if y ⊆ x then y=x} The set of X-minimal
elements.
ATOM = min(B−{0}) The set of B−{0}-minimal elements.
In Link’s count domain, ATOM is a subset of B that generates B.
Central for the present paper are the notions of disjointness and
overlap:
Disjointness and overlap:
x and y overlap iff x u y 6= 0, otherwise x and y are disjoint.
x and y overlap if they have a non-null part
in common.
X overlaps iff for some x, y ∈ X: x and y overlap, otherwise X is disjoint.





I call Link-style Boolean semantics Mountain semantics, because the se-
mantics of count nouns is grounded in the bottom of the count domain:
the singular noun cat denotes at index w,t a set of atoms CATw,t, say,
{ronya, emma, shunra}; the plural noun cats denotes the closure of this
under sum: *CATw,t, which is a mountain rising up from the denotation
of the singular noun. Since the individual cats are atoms, the relation
to their mass parts is indirect:
The set of atoms and the notion of atomicity play a pivotal role in the
approach to the mass-count distinction of Mountain semantics. Count
noun denotations are distinguished from mass noun denotations in that
the elements in a count noun denotation can be counted, and allow dis-
tribution. These notions are defined in terms of atoms in Mountain
semantics, and their correctness relies on a central property of sets of
atoms in complete Boolean algebras:
Counting in terms of atoms: Plurality x in the denotation of cats counts
as three cats iff
x has three atomic parts (provably, these are in the denotation of
cat).
Distribution in terms of atoms: each of the cats means: each of the
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atomic parts of the sum
of the cats (again, provably, these are in the denotation of cat).
Correctness of counting:
If A ⊆ ATOM then *A itself has the structure of a complete atomic
Boolean algebra with A as its set of atoms.
This property allows correct counting: every element in the count do-
main has a unique count, and no elements are skipped over. Thus, if
you are a sum of three cats, you provably have as parts one sum of
three cats (yourself), three sums of two cats, three single cats and the
null object.
A less attractive side-effect is that you don’t have any other parts.
Mountain semantics is forced into sorted domains with independent
part-of relations. This means that there is basically no relation between
the part-of order on the Boolean domain and intuitive lexical part-of
relations: since Ronya is a (singular) cat, she is an atom in B; since
her left front leg is a (singular) leg, it is an atom in B; and since her
left front paw is a paw, it too is an atom in B. Thus these objects do
not stand in a part-of relation that is internal to the Boolean theory.
Similarly, the relation between objects and the mass stuff making them
up is not internal: the stuff making up Ronya is not part of Ronya, since
Ronya is an atom.
I accepted these conclusions cheerfully in Landman (1989, 1991).
But already in Landman (1991) I argued that this means that we must
distinguish as distinct many ’flavors’ of the same objects (like a mass
version of a plural object, a sum version, a group version, etc.) and rely
heavily on shifting between domains. The sorting problem is brought
out sharply by the Problem of Portions. Portions are, what we could call,
countable mass. Look at the examples in (1):
(1) a. The coffee in the pot and the coffee in the cup were each
spiked with strychnine.
b. I drank two cups of coffee. I didn’t ingest the cups, so I drank
two portions of coffee.
(1a), a variant of an example in Landman (1991), shows that we can
distribute with each to two items: the coffee in the pot and the coffee in
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the cup. Such distribution is indicative for count interpretations. The
problem is that coffee is a mass noun, and hence its denotation is un-
countable stuff. And coffee plus coffee is more coffee, more uncount-
able stuff. But then, how can we distribute in (1a)? Similarly in (1b),
where we count two portions of coffee. Intuitively, a portion of coffee
is coffee. And coffee plus coffee is more coffee. So how can we count
two portions of coffee in (1b) if we only have stuff?
In Landman (1991) I proposed, for examples like (1a), an opera-
tion that shifts mass objects to atoms in the count domain. This shifts
makes mass entities countable. But that does mean that we are go-
ing to have in our domains distinct objects: Ronya (count), the stuff
making up Ronya (mass), the latter mass stuff as a portion of cat stuff
(count),. . .And it doesn’t stop here.
I am not going to argue that this is a wrong approach (it can be made
coherent, if complex). But it does seem a bit as if we are shoehorning
portions into out sorted structures solely for the sake of atomicity: if we
had a working theory in which counting doesn’t depend on atomicity,
we could hope to accept portions as both mass and countable. Welcome
to Iceberg semantics.
1.3. Iceberg semantics
In Iceberg semantics nouns are interpreted as icebergs: they consist of a
body and a base and the body is grounded in the base. For count nouns,
the body looks just like what we assumed in Mountain semantics: the
body of the Iceberg interpretation of plural noun cats is the closure
under sum *CATwt of the base of its interpretation CATw,t, which is also
the body (and base) of the interpretation of singular noun cat. So plural
nouns are mountains rising up from bases. But the base is not a set of
atoms, the elements of the base have parts within the Boolean domain
B, so the base is, so to say, lifted from the bottom, and it floats.
This means, then, that the notion of singularity is loosened from
the notion of atomicity. In fact, both the mass-count distinction and
the singular-plural distinction will be defined for icebergs in relation
to their base. This means that the same body will be mass or count
depending on the base it is grounded in. It will also mean that the same
body will be singular or plural depending on the base it is grounded in.
The base forms a perspective on the body, the body itself is unsorted.
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If we get rid of atomicity, how do we guarantee the correctness of
counting, since in Mountain semantics it is the grounding of the de-
notation of plural nouns in the atomic denotations of singular nouns
that gives plural nouns the correct counting structure? If we give up on
atomicity, how can we guarantee the correct structure?
The answer is that in complete Boolean algebras it is not atomicity
itself that guarantees correctness of counting, but a property that sets
of atoms have, namely disjointness:
Correctness of counting:
If X is disjoint then *X has the structure of a complete atomic Boolean
algebra with Z as its set of atoms.
Iceberg semantics takes this as its lead: it lifts the denotation of cat and
cats off the atomic bottom (in fact, it no longer requires there to be an
atomic bottom at all), and assumes that their denotations are grounded
in a disjoint base.
Formally, we assume that NPs are interpreted as iceberg sets [i-sets]:
i-sets: An i-set is a pair consisting of a body set and a base set, with the
body generated by the base under ⊔: X = < body(X), base(X) > with
body(X), base(X) ⊆ B and body(X) ⊆ *base(X).
Iceberg semantics:
Singular noun cat and plural noun cats are counted in terms of the same
disjoint base:
cat→ < CATw,t, CATw,t>, with CATw,t a disjoint set.
cats→ <*CATw,t, CATw,t>
Landman (2016) extends iceberg semantics for NPs to DPs. The exten-
sion is based on the notion of i-object: a pair <body, base>, with the
body ∈ B, base ⊆ B and body = ⊔base. i-objects are count if their base
is disjoint, singular if their base is a singleton. Thus the sum of the cats
will count as a count object relative to its count base CATw,t, but the
same sum of cats will count as a mass object relative to, say, the set that
contains the minimal identifiable cat-stuff:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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1.4. The distinctions mass-count and neat-mess
The basic idea is the following. Let X be an i-set.
Mass -count i-sets: X is count iff base(X) is disjoint, otherwise X is mass.
Count nouns are interpreted as i-sets with a disjoint base, mass nouns
as i-sets with an overlapping base.
This is the basic idea, but we need to refine the analysis in order to
deal with borderline situations. For example, we want to allow mass
nouns to denote, relative to certain indices, the empty i-set <Ø,Ø> (i.e.
indices where the denotation of mud is empty). But technically, <Ø,
Ø> is count, since technically the empty set is disjoint. If we require
mass nouns to be interpreted at every index as a mass i-set, we don’t
allow empty interpretations. On the other hand, we don’t want the
interpretations of mass nouns to be completely unconstrained.
We will allow mass noun α to denote count i-sets in situation that
are borderline for α. I don’t have a theory of what counts as borderline
situations for mass nouns, but they will include situations where the
denotation of mass noun gold is the empty set or a singleton set. Al-
lowing these denotations in should not challenge the status of gold as
a mass noun, as long as they are marked as special cases.
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Mass-count NPs: Let α be an NP and w,t an index.
w,t is α-normal if JαKw,t is not borderline for α.
α is count iff for every index w,t: JαKw,t is count.
α is mass iff for every α-normal index w,t: JαKw is mass.
Presupposition: ceteris paribus, contextually relevant indices are α-normal.
This means that in all contexts we interpret count nouns as count i-sets,
and in normal contexts we interpret mass nouns as mass i-sets. And we
presuppose that when we interpret mass noun α in context, we can
assume that the relevant indices are normal.
Landman (2011) defines the notions of neat and mess, and pro-
poses to use this distinction to characterize the difference between mass
nouns like kitchenware (neat) and mass nouns like mud (mess). The no-
tions below are changed a bit from Landman (2011):
Neat-mess i-sets:
X is neat iff min(base(X)) is disjoint and min(base(X)) generates base(X)
under ⊔, otherwise X is mess.
The intuition for neat mass nouns is that the distinction between sin-
gular and plural is not properly articulated in the base: min(base) ⊆
base ⊆ *min(base).
Here too, the borderline case is the case where min(base) = base,
which means that count should be borderline neat.
Neat-mess NPs: Let α be an NP and w,t an index.
α is neat iff for every index w,t: JαKw,t is neat and at every α-normal
index: JαKw,t is neat mass.
α is mess iff for every α-normal index w,t: JαKw is mess mass.
This means then that neat mass nouns are neat in all contexts, and mass
in normal contexts, and mess mass nouns are mess mass in all normal
contexts.
As in Landman (2011), both distinctions mass-count and neat-mess
are grounded in the notions of disjointness and overlap. The present
theory differs from Landman (2011) mainly in doing more justice to
the idea that there are different ways in which denotations can turn
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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out to be mess mass. In particular, Landman (2011) defined i-sets to
be mess mass if min(base) overlaps. My present view is that that was
an unnecessary stipulation: on the present definition an i-set will also
come out as mess mass, if, say, the base itself is atomless, hence has no
minimal elements.
[My aim in Landman (2011) was to shift the focus of mass nouns away from
looking vertically (atomic versus atomless) to horizontal (disjointness versus
overlap). However, once this shift is established, and atoms are made irrelevant
in the theory, there is actually no reason to exclude atomless bases, and in fact,
there is reason to allow them. I discuss the case of water in Landman (2011),
and suggest that water can be seen as a union of partitions of contextually
minimal water parts, where a block of such a contextual partition may consist
of one molecule of water and space around it, so the partition does not cut
up water molecules, but it does cut up space. However, for a given contextual
partition and a given block b, there are going to be alternative partitions where
one of the blocks b’ is the result of cutting off a bit of the space in b. Allowing
both b and b’ in the base brings us well on the way towards an atomless base.]
Iceberg semantics proposes to use bases for distinguishing count
nouns (disjoint base) from mass nouns. As discussed here and in
Landman (2016), for count nouns bases are used for counting, count-
comparison, and distribution. I assume then that disjoint base is a
grammatical property, a requirement on the semantics interpretation
of count nouns. Except for the formulation in terms of bases, this is
also what Rothstein (2011) proposes.
Rothstein moreover argues that it is important to interpret the gram-
matically relevant notion of disjointness as contextual disjointness. The
denotations of nouns like fence and body part are not conceptually dis-
joint. But they are count nouns and that means that they are contextu-
ally coerced into disjointness by the disjoint base requirement on count
nouns.
That disjointness is relevant for counting can be seen, for instance,
by the bafflement of native speakers when you put a noun like body part,
whose denotation is not conceptually disjoint, in a counting context that
draws attention to the possibility of overlap:
(2) Fingers on the buzzers and answer directly when you ring the
bell: How many body parts does a Hippopotamus have?
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This means that Iceberg semantics for count nouns assumes that
there are contextual strategies for eliminating overlap. The simplest
is contextual restriction: make sure that you choose your fences dis-
joint in a counting context. This was suggested in Rothstein (2010).
A more challenging operation, overlap elimination by doppelgänger,
is discussed in Landman (2017).[This operation allows us to replace in a
counting context, for the sake of interpretation, in overlapping objects, say,
roads x and y, the overlap, x ⊓ y, by disjoint objects, xx⊓y and yx⊓y , which are
indistinguishable from x ⊓ y and each other.]
For mass nouns, bases are used for distinguishing neat mass nouns
from mess mass nouns. Here too, for neat mass nouns, bases are used
for count-comparison and distribution. And here too, the neat-mess dis-
tinction can be argued to be a grammatical distinction based similarly
on contextual disjointness. For more discussion, see Landman 2017ms,
2016.)
1.5. Iceberg semantics for numerical modifiers
Counting requires a disjoint base. We formalize that by introducing a
presuppositional notion of cardinality in Iceberg semantics:
Presuppositional cardinality:
The cardinality of x relative to Z is the cardinality of the set of Z-parts
of x, presupposing that Z is disjoint.
We can use this notion to clarify the connection between count
nouns and counting.
Counting and mass: Let α be a mass noun, and β an NP-modifier.
If for all α-normal indices: JβαKw,t = ⊥, then βα is infelicitous.
Below we give a semantics for at least three α which involves the state-
ment that card(base(α) ≥ 3. This is only going to be defined at an
index w,t if base(α) is disjoint at w,t. For mass noun mud, such indices
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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are not mud-normal, hence we derive:
Fact: Numerical predicates cannot felicitously modify mass nouns:
at least three mud is infelicitous.
In this section, I discuss the semantics of numerical modifiers, mainly
to set the stage for Part Two: the semantics of classifiers and measures.
Landman (2016) contains discussion of other modifiers.
It is time to introduce the compositional mechanism of Iceberg se-
mantics, and the central assumption (for English and Dutch) linking the
syntax and semantics of complex NPs: the Head principle (for NPs):
Let H be an NP and C a complex NP with syntactic head H. So C = [NP
α H ] or C = [NP H α].
H and C denote i-sets: H = <body(H), base(H)> and C = <body(C),
base(C)>.
Head principle for NPs:
base(C) = (body(C)] ∩ base(H)
The head principle says that the base of the interpretation of the com-
plex C is the set of all Boolean parts of the body of the interpretation of
C, intersected with the base of the interpretation of the syntactic head
H.
The head principle is the assumption that in the interpretation of
headed complex NPs, the semantics passes base-information up from
the head H to the complex NP. As we will see, we make this assumption
both for modifier structures (adjuncts) and for complement structures
(classifiers).
We follow the semantics for numerical modifiers proposed in Land-
man 2004. This means that we assume a category of number relation
expressions, like at most, at least, exactly and - (null), which are inter-
preted as number relations:
at least→ ≥ at most→ ≤ exactly→ = -→ = number relations.
These expressions combine through application with number expres-
sion three - which denotes the number 3 - to form number predicates,
denoting sets of numbers:
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at least three→ λn.n ≤ 3 at most three→ λn.n ≤ 3 - three→ λn.n=3
We derive numerical relations from number predicates by compositing
the number predicate with card:
Numerical predicates: at least three→ λn.n ≥ 3 ◦ card
= λZλx. card[x,Z] ≥ 3
Hence, composition derives as the interpretation of at least three, the re-
lation that holds between x and base set Z if the cardinality of x relative
to Z is at least three.
This is the analysis of Landman (2004). We now need to cast this in
the Iceberg semantics framework. We assume that numerical modifier
phrases like at least three denote functions from i-sets to i-sets. This
means that we need to turn the numerical relation into a function from
i-sets to i-sets. We do that by the following schema:
Shift numerical relations to functions from i-sets to i-sets:
α a variable over numerical relations, P over i-sets
-α here is a numerical relation like λXλx. card[x,X] ≥ 3. This relation
inherits its presupposionality from card. This brings in the presuppo-
sition presP,α on the interpretation of the numerical modifier, that the
base of the interpretation of the head it modifies must be disjoint (so
the head noun must be a count noun).
- baseP,α is the base of the interpretation of the complex. This is deter-
mined by the Head principle.
- bodyP,α = body(P) ∩α(base(P)
Look at what this means for the interpretation of at least three, i.e. nu-
merical relation λZλx. card[x,Z] ≥ 3:
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This is just the interpretation that you would get in Mountain semantics,
except, of course, that cardinality is not defined in terms of atoms, but
in terms of the disjoint base of the interpretation of the head.
Let us apply the interpretation for at least three to the interpretation
of cats,<*CATw,t, CATw,t>, and to avoid issues of triviality, let us assume
that CATw,t is a disjoint set of at least three cats. Filling in all the details,
we derive as the interpretation of at least three cats:
Given that the numerical modifier is purely quantitative (and our non-
triviality assumption)
( body ] = *CATw,t, hence: base = CATw,t.
So if CATw,t = { r(onya), e(mma), s(hunra), t(ijger) }, we derive for at
least three cats:
body = { r⊔e⊔s, r⊔e⊔t, r⊔s⊔t, e⊔s⊔t, r⊔e⊔s⊔t } a set of strict plurali-
ties
base = { r, e, s, t }
Note that the base is not a subset of the body (but, of course, the body
is generated by the base).
The analysis shows that we have achieved what we set out to achieve:
we have given an Iceberg semantic analysis of numerical modifiers which
counts sums in the body of the interpretation of cats in terms of the el-
ements in the base of the interpretation of cats.
The base is also used for the other hallmark of the count domain:
distribution, for example with count distributor each. In (3), a sum
of cats in the denotation of three pet cats counts as a sum of three in
relation to the base of the interpretation of the subject three pet cats,
which is PETw,t ∩ CATw,t (see Landman 2016 for Iceberg semantics for
such modifiers).
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(3) Three pet cats should each have their own basket.
Each in the VP distributes the VP property to the elements of this set:
(3) expresses that if in your house there is a sum x of three pet cats, the
parts of x that are in PETw,t ∩ CATw,t should have their own basket.
2. CLASSIFIERS, MEASURES AND PORTIONS
Head principle for NPs:
base(C) = (body(C)] ∩ base(H)
The base of C is the part set of the body of C intersected with
the base of H.
In the previous section we illustrated the head principle in the case of
numerical modifiers. We are now concerned with the following conse-
quence of the principle:
Fact: If base(H) is disjoint, then base(C) is disjoint.
This means that we should find the following mass-count properties for
complex nouns:
Corollary: Mass-count
The mass-count characteristics of the head inherit up to the complex:
Complex noun phrases are count if the head is count.
Complex noun phrases are mass if the head is mass.
We explore this in the context of classifier and measure phrases.
2.1. Classifiers and measures in English and Dutch
Classifiers and measures are pseudo-partitives in English, they take el-
ement of, which is neither a preposition, nor a partitive marker, and in
fact, a similar marker is absent in Dutch (as shown in (4a)); they take
mass or plural NPs as complements, but not singular NPs (as shown in
(4b)); classifiers and measures agree in number with numerical modi-



























#One kilo of ball bearing
#Eén kilo kogellager
c. Two packs of rice Two kilos of rice Twee pakken rijst
As Doetjes (1997) points out, measures in Dutch are in general not spec-
ified for number: specifying plurality on the measure generally triggers
a classifier interpretation for the measure (cf. Doetjes 1997; Rothstein



























Furthermore, in Dutch, classifiers and measures agree in gender with
determiners (thanks to Hanna de Vries for bringing this up): in (6), the
neuter demonstrative dat agrees with the neuter measure pond and not
with the masculine noun suiker:
(6) Je hebt één pond suiker nodig. Dat ene pond suiker gaan hele-
maal op.
You need one pound of sugar. That one pound of sugar will be used up
completely.
Most remarkable from a semantic point of view is the cheerful shift-
ing between measure and classifier interpretations (as in (7) and (8)):
(7) Joha’s mother said to him: "Go and buy me two liters of milk."
So Joha went to buy her two liters of milk. He arrived home and
knocked on the door with one liter of milk. His mother said to
him: "I asked you for two liters. Where is the second one?" Her
son said to her: "It broke, mother." [γ] measure→ classifier
(8) a. There was also the historic moment when I accidentally
flushed a bottle of lotion down the toilet. That one took
a plumber a few hours of manhandling every pipe in the
house to fix. [γ] classifier
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b. This is one of the few drain cleaners that says it’s safe for
toilet use, so I flushed a bottle of it down the toilet and
waited overnight. [γ] measure
[I thank Larry Horn for introducing me to the use
of [γ] to indicate ’googled’ examples.]
Rothstein (2011) proposes (following, among others, Landman (2004))
semantic interpretations for classifier phrases and measure phrases along
the following lines:
Classifier interpretation: three glasses of wine→ three ∩ (glass(wine))
glass applies to wine; three intersects with
the result.
On the classifier interpretation, the semantic head is the classifier glass.
This will derive classifier interpretations like the following:
three glasses of wine = three glasses filled with wine
These interpretations are container classifier interpretations. We will
discuss other classifier interpretations below, but they will follow the
same semantic composition.
Measure interpretation: three liters of wine→ (three ◦ liter) ∩ wine
three composes with liter; the result intersects
with wine.
On the measure interpretation, the semantic head is the non-measure
wine. This will derive measure interpretations like the following:
three liters of wine = wine to the amount of three liters
three boxes of books = books to the amount of three boxfuls
The Iceberg semantics for classifiers and measures that I will develop
here will follow these semantic derivations.
Rothstein (2011, in press) goes one step further, and argues, with
evidence from Mandarin Chinese, Modern Hebrew, Hungarian, Dutch
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and English, that the semantic difference between measure phrases and























Rothstein’s proposal for measure phrases:
1. Measure phrases have measure structure and measure interpre-
tation. So syntax and semantics are matched.
2. The syntactic head of the measure phrase is the non-singular
noun phrase, NP[–sing].
3. Semantically, NP[–sing] is reinterpreted as a mass noun.
Rothstein (2011) argues that measure phrases pattern with mass nouns
(we discuss this in section 2.4.2). This is what motivates the third as-
sumption: on Rothstein’s analysis NP[–sing] is both the syntactic and
the semantic head of the measure construction. If it is semantically
reinterpreted as a mass noun, we expect the measure phrases to pat-
tern with mass nouns.
While I find the arguments in Rothstein (2011) and Rothstein (in
press) that Mandarin and Hebrew measure phrases have this measure
structure compelling, I do not accept her arguments for Dutch and En-
glish.
Rothstein’s strongest argument for this assumption in Dutch and
English concerns the contrast in (9), in a context where the price of the
cups itself is irrelevant:
(9) a. Øtwee dure bekers ijs
ØTwo expensive cups of icecream
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b. #Twee dure liter ijs
#Two expensive liters of icecream
Rothstein argues as follows:
-(9a) allows in principle two syntactic structures, based on the classifier
structure: [two [ [expensive cups] (of) icecream ]] and [two [ expensive
[ cups (of) icecream]]].
The first structure is, by assumption, irrelevant; the second forms the
basis for the felicitous natural interpretation.
-(9b) allows only the measure structure: [[ two expensive liters] ] (of)
icecream ]].
But expensive cannot modify measure liters, so (9b) is infelicitous.
I want to place the data in (9) in a wider context. Look at classifier
example (9c), again in a natural situation where it is not the cup that
is melted:
(9) c. #Twee gesmolten bekers ijs.
#Two melted cups of icecream.
The observation is that (9c) also seems infelicitous if it is only the ice-
cream that is melted. If so, the semantics apparently cannot derive
melted(cups(icecream)) with interpretation: cups( melted(icecream)
), i.e. skipping over, so to say, the cups. (The difference with (9a) is
that in (9a) the natural interpretation does not skip over the cups: it is
the "cup cum icecream experience" that you pay for in a certain kind of
restaurant.)
But this is directly relevant for the example (9b): if we cannot get
the skip-over interpretation in classifier derivations, we surely would
not expect to be able to get a hop-skip-jump interpretation (two ◦
liter) ∩ (expensive(icecream)) of the measure derivation (two ◦ ex-
pensive(liter)) ∩ icecream in (9b).
The conclusion is that the measure semantics that is shared between
Rothstein and me all by itself accounts for the differences observed in
(9), without making any assumptions about the syntax.
But there is another point to be made. While [γ]-searching for vari-
ants of the expression (9b) and (9c) does not yield a rich crop, such
examples do occur (thanks to Richard Larson for stressing this point):
(10) a. To add jungle vines to your plantation, select one mixed
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pound of seedy grapes, red, blue and green. Eat them ten-
derly so as not to bruise the seeds. [γ]
b. Patty uses five pounds of the clay to make a vase; she
gives this vase to Kevin. She also gives the five remain-
ing pounds of clay to Kevin (perhaps with a note about
the pleasures of the potter’s wheel). [γ]
c. 20,000 shredded pounds of ice make a pretty awesome
sledding hill. [γ]
Since the examples in (10) involve measures, and (10b,c) clearly mea-
sure interpretations, these examples should be ungrammatical on Roth-
stein’s analysis, which seems rather harsh.
On my analysis, such examples are not ungrammatical, and the ex-
amples in (10) can be accommodated as follows. Classifiers, measures,
and adjectival modifiers all have interpretations (basically) as functions
from i-sets to i-sets. This means, technically, that there could be another
derivation possibility: compose the classifier/measure with the adjec-
tive, and then follow the derivation as usual. And this, when worked
out properly, generates exactly the skip-over reading:
(cups ◦ melted) (icecream)) = (cups(melted(icecream))
(two ◦ (liter ◦ expensive)) ∩ icecream= (two ◦ liter) ∩ (expensive(icecream))
My suggestion is that interpreting the adjective via composition with
the classifier/measure is not an operation that is readily available, and
it may be indeed strictly unavailable for speakers who don’t accept cases
like (10) at all (like Susan Rothstein). But, the suggestion is that, for
others, applying this composition is an option that is in some contexts
available, and it makes skip-over interpretations possible.
So the evidence from adjectives does not point at the need to as-
sume the measure syntax, and in fact the measure syntax may be a
bother more than a boon, which means that ceteris paribus, I’d rather
not assume that structure.
Now, we have already seen above in (6) that gender agreement in
Dutch is always with the classifier or the measure, never with NP[–
plur]. I do not have the space to discuss the complexities of number-
agreement here, but I argue in Landman (2017) that the situation is in
essence similar: the facts do not justify the assumption that in phrases
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with a measure interpretation NP[–plur] is the syntactic head. Roth-
stein’s measure structure gives NPs with a measure phrase, like at least
three liters of wine, the same structure as NPs with numerical modifiers,
like at least three boys, that is, a modifier structure. Given the syntactic
differences observed, this requires a syntactic theory in which the same
modification geometry is input to two very different agreement mech-
anisms. To me this seems once again more a bother than a boon, and
ceteris paribus, I’d rather not assume that structure.
My attitude towards Rothstein’s third assumption, the systematic
reinterpretation of plural NP[–sing] as a mass noun, is similar, though
for different reasons. Note first that the reinterpretation involves a shift
from the plural noun to a neat mass noun, which is, in Rothstein’s the-
ory, a very minimal shift from a count set of object-context pairs to the
corresponding set of objects, which is neat mass. So the shift is not
grinding, which is shifting to a mess mass interpretation. This is impor-
tant, since there is no evidence for obligatory reinterpretation of plural
count nouns as mess mass nouns in this context. Look at example (11):
(11) The truck toppled over and five hundred boxes of ball bearings
were rolling over the highway, causing a major traffic jam.
This example is nicely ambiguous between a classifier interpretation,
where it is five hundred boxes that rolled over the highway, and a mea-
sure interpretation, where it is ball bearings to the amount of 500 box-
fuls that rolled over the highway. But it is precisely on the measure
interpretation that it is ball bearings rolling over the highway. There
is no natural sense in which that interpretation involves by necessity a
reinterpretation of ball bearings as a mess mass noun, ball bearing mess.
But the assumption that the reinterpretation involved is the minimal
type readjustment of the plural count noun to a neat mass noun brings
in a puzzle. As is well-known, the italicized context in (12) is a context
where, in English, bare singular count nouns cannot naturally occur:
(12) The Thai restaurant was advertised as the award winning restau-
rant from two consecutive years, so we decided to try Thai food




Rothstein (2011) accounts for the differences observed by Cheng et al.
(2008) between cases like (12) in English and corresponding examples
in Mandarin, by assuming that in Mandarin the bare noun correspond-
ing to cockroach is neat mass, and, because of that, you get a count
interpretation (cockroaches swimming in the soup), while in English in
(12), the bare noun shifts to a mess mass noun by grinding.
But now we have a puzzle in English: the minimal shift from the
count noun to the neat mass noun that Rothstein postulates in measure
phrases would resolve the grammatical mismatch in (12) much more
efficiently than grinding, and it would get the same interpretation for
(12) as in Mandarin, an interpretation that is not available in English.
Clearly, then, shifting from count noun interpretations to neat noun
interpretations is available in English only under very restricted circum-
stances that do not include cases like (12). Now, I can come up with a
story myself for why this would be so (say, based on competition), but
I have the option here to choose the simpler solution: the shift to neat
mass noun interpretations doesn’t happen, because it doesn’t exist.
In this paper, then, I will make the following alternative assump-
tions:
1. Measure phrases have the classifier structure and a measure inter-
pretation. So there is a mismatch between syntax and semantics.
2. The syntactic head of the measure phrase is the measure.
3. Semantically, the measure itself is mass.
If the measure is mass and the measure is the head of the measure
construction, then, by the Head principle, the measure phrase itself
comes out as mass. This means that we will be able to derive, with
a standard syntax, the result about measure phrases that Rothstein’s
reinterpretation stipulation was concerned with.
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2.2. Semantics of classifiers














We will focus on deriving the semantics of classifier phrase glass
of wine, and assume that semantic pluralization and modification with
three takes place on the classifier interpretation derived.
We start out with mass noun wine and count noun glass, with interpre-
tations:
noun: wine → WINEw,t = <WINEw,t, base(WINEw,t)>
noun: glass → GLASSw,t = <GLASSw,t, GLASSw,t>, with GLASSw,t dis-
joint.
We assume that the noun glass becomes a classifier glass, and this in-
volves shifting its interpretation from an i-set to a function from i-sets
to i-sets:
Classifier: glass→ classifier[GLASSw,t] a function from i-sets to i-sets
It will be useful here to specify a general schema for the interpretation
of classifiers, so that below, when we are concerned with different clas-
sifier interpretations, we only need to specify the variable parameters
for the different interpretations.




presP specifies potential further presuppositions (we see this below in
the discussion of contents classifiers). Apart from that, the schema tells
us that, if the base of the noun that the classifier is based on is given,
we only need to specify bodyP.
Given all this, we will give a semantics for container classifiers and
various types of portion classifiers, in particular, shape classifiers and
contents classifiers.
2.3. Semantics of container classifiers
The first classifier interpretation we are concerned with is the container
interpretation:
three glasses of wine = three glasses filled with wine
In the classifier interpretation schema α = <GLASSw,t, GLASSw,t>. We
specify bodyP:
Container interpretation:
bodyP = λx.GLASSw,t(x) ∧ body(P)(contents[GLASS, P,c],w,t(x))
The set of glasses containing body(P)
The basis of the container interpretation is the function contents.
contents[GLASS, WINE,c],w,t : B→ B ∪ ⊥
The contents function specifies for a container at an index its relevant
contents: the relevant stuff that is in the container. The function is
constrained by a further parameter sequence:
[container property GLASS, contents property WINE, context C].
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This parameter sequence is used to impose constraints on contents.
For instance, an obvious constraint is:
Containers and contents:
contents[GLASS, WINE,c],w,t(x) = y presupposes that x is a glass and re-
quires that y is wine.
There are all sorts of other constraints on relevant contexts:
- For glasses and wine, contents concerns liquid contents and not
the gaseous contents, i.e. we ignore the air hovering above the
wine inside the glass.
- contents requires the amount of wine in the glass to be within a
certain range.
Look at (13):
(13) [Next to Susan is a wineglass with less than a centimeter wine
left in it. Susan to Fred:]
a. You see that wineglass? Can you fill it up please?
b. #You see that glass of wine? Can you fill it up please?
(13a) is felicitous (in fact, frequent), (13b) is infelicitous: what counts
as a glass of wine is relative to what is standard for GLASS and WINE and
the context C, and this means that a glass with an amount of wine in it
below the standard doesn’t count as a glass of wine.
What counts changes when we vary the parameters: the same amount
of single malt as in (13) in a scotch glass may well count as a glass of
Lagavulin. The same amount of wine as in (13) in the same wine glass
would have counted as a glass of wine when Susan was pregnant.
-The wine may be mixed with non-wine but only to a certain ex-
tent. In classical Greece wine was always drunk mixed with water, some
drinks naturally allow water, some an olive, a piece of lemon, a grape
pit,. . .without affecting the contents. Thus, it is still a glass of mescal,
even if it has a worm in it. But not every additive can be ignored: if
you pour diesel oil in my glass of Chassagne Montrachet, it is no longer
a glass of wine (and also the end of a beautiful friendship).
We continue with the semantic derivation. [For readability I will sup-
press the parameter index [GLASS, WINE,C] on contents, and use extensional
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property variables, instead of the proper intensional ones, see Landman 2017ms
for discussion.]
bodyP = λx.GLASSw,t(x) ∧ body(P)(contentsw,t(x))
baseP = ( bodyP ] ∩ GLASSw,t = bodyP
We apply to the i-set interpretation of wine and get:
[NP glass of wine ]→ <base, base>
base = λx.GLASSw,t(x) ∧ WINEw,t(contentsw,t(x))
The set of glasses that contain wine.
Now we observe: glass is a count noun, hence GLASSw,t is disjoint. That
means that the base of the container interpretation of glass of wine is
disjoint, and we have derived:
Fact: glass of wine, with glass a container classifier, is a singular count
NP.
2.4. Portion and measures interpretations
Before we analyze portion readings and measure readings, we establish
the basic distinction that the semantics will have to support. We just
derived that container classifier readings are count readings. We will
see that portion classifier readings, even though they may well concern
mass stuff, pattern with count nouns, so portion readings also ought to
come out as count. We show, following Rothstein (2011), that measure
readings pattern with mass nouns.
2.4.1. Portion classifiers interpretations are count
So far we have followed Rothstein (2011) and distinguished container
classifier readings from measure readings. We add to that now portion
readings:
Three glasses of wine:
container reading three glasses containing wine
measure reading wine to the amount of three glassfuls
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portion reading three wine portions each of which is the contents of
a glass of wine
We find the portion reading for sixteen glasses of wine in (13):
(14) I have put sixteen glasses of wine ready in a row, of different
sizes, as you can see. We are going to put all of it into the brew
in the course of two hours. As you will see, most of the sixteen
glasses of wine are put into the soup during the first half an
hour of brewing.
First note that the container reading is not relevant: we are not going
to put the glasses in the brew. Note secondly that the measure reading
is not relevant either: the glasses are specified as being of different
sizes. The essence of the measure reading is that glass as a measure is
interpreted as glassful, an amount that may be contextually given, but
is fixed. This is irrelevant in (14), because what we pour in at different
times is indeed wine, but not glassfuls of wine, not every time the same
fixed amount. Thus we have a true portion reading in (14): we pour
into the brew wine in portions of different size.
Now look at the interpretation of most in (14). Most in (14) involves
a comparison in terms of the number of portions of wine, not in terms
of the amount of wine (i.e. if during the first half an hour we pour into the
brew the contents of 12 scotch glasses, and during the remainder one and a
half hour the contents of 4 half-liter beer glasses, (14) is true). This means
that the portion reading is a count reading.
So indeed, portion readings are readings that denote stuff, like mass
nouns, but are count. Other portion classifiers are shape classifiers like
hunk, slice, stack (of hay), strand (of hair):
A hunk of meat = meat in the shape of a hunk
A slice of meat = meat in the shape of a slice
Shape classifiers are portion classifiers, like measures they denote stuff
if NP[–plur] denotes stuff:
A hunk of meat is meat.
A kilo of meat is meat.
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But shape classifiers are count:
(15) a. I don’t eat Ømuch /#many meat sliced nowadays. mass
b. I don’t eat #much /Ømany slices of meat nowadays count
c. Most of the slices of meat are pork count comparison
As in (14), most in (15c) makes a comparison in terms of the number
of slices of meat, not in terms of the weight or volume of the meat.
Partee & Borschev (2012) discuss portion readings (tentatively) as a sub-
case of measure readings. Schvarcz (2014) argues with Hungarian data that
portion readings are count. Khrizman et al. (2015) argue that portion readings
differ systematically from measure readings, and they offer cross-linguistic ev-
idence to this effect. I present some of the cases discussed in Khrizman et al.
(2015) in section 2.7.
2.4.2. Measure interpretations are mass
I start with a preamble about partitives. Partitives with singular count
DPs like of the cat pattern with partitives with mass DPs like of the wine
(they are called entity partitives by Helen (1997)):
(16) a. Ømuch of the wine/ #each of the wine
b. Ømuch of the cat / #one of the cat
Landman (2017) argues that if we assume that the semantics of the
partitive disallows singular i-objects as the partitive complement, then
partitives with singular count DPs can only be felicitous by shifting
the singular count object (e.g. <ronya,ronya>) to a mass object (e.g.
<ronya,mass-base>). On the analysis given in Landman (2017), this
makes the partitive NP of the cat indeed a mass NP. This analysis in-
volves what has been called grinding, but is better called opening up,
since the shift opens up internal structure for measurement. Thus, (17)
is treated as a case of opening up:
(17) After the kindergarten party, much of my daughter was covered
with paint.
With the opening up shift, the mass-semantics of much in terms of, say,
area-measure becomes available, and with an appropriate contextual
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restriction, (17) means that much of the surface area of my daughter was
covered with paint.
On the suggested analysis, opening up is always involved in parti-
tives with singular count DPs. Examples which involve opening up in
partitives with plural DPs can also be found, (18) is a [γ]- example:
(18) While our current sensibilities are accustomed to the tans, tau-
pes, grays and browns, in their time much of the rooms as well
as the cathedral proper would have been beautifully painted.
[γ]
But such cases are actually rare, hard to find, and even so, not every-
body is happy with them (Susan Rothstein, for instance, doesn’t much
like (18)). The analysis of partitives sketched here plays actually no
further role in the present paper. The marginality of cases like (18)
does. Rothstein’s argument that measure phrases pattern with mass
nouns concerns mass effects in partitives with plural measure DPs. But,
in contrast with cases like (18), the measure cases below are normal
examples, generally accepted as perfectly felicitous, and not rare ei-
ther. [Well, to my surprise I got nothing when I [γ]-ed with kilos, but when I
had the luminous idea to replace kilos by kg. the examples streamed in.] This
means that Rothstein’s examples cannot be explained away as instances
of opening up along the lines of (18): they tell us something important
about measure phrases.
With this in mind, we come to the examples. We look at much in
English and het meeste-most in Dutch and the contrasts in (19) and (20):
(19) a. #Much ball bearings was sold this month.
b.#?Much of the ball bearings was sold this month.
c. ØMuch of the ten kilos of ball bearings was sold this month
(20) a. #Het meeste kogellagers is deze maand verkocht.
(ØDe meeste kogellagers zijn deze maand verkocht.)
b.#?Het meeste van de kogellagers is deze maand verkocht.
c. ØHet meeste van de tien kilo kogellagers is deze maand
verkocht.
-(19a) and (20a) are completely out, because much and het meeste se-
lect for mass nouns.
-(19b) and (20b) are not much better (no [γ]-hits). If felicitous, they
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are understood via opening up, that is, (20b) suggests a peculiar mass
reading.
-But (19c) and (20c) are perfectly fine, and express a comparison of the
total body of ball bearings relating to the measure kilo.
We see the same contrast in (21) (based on examples from Rothstein
2011):
(21) a. Many of the twenty kilos of potatoes that we sampled at
the food show were prepared in special ways.
b. Much of the three kilos of potatoes that I ate had a pleasant
taste.
-(21a) has a portion interpretation. We went with a group to the food
show, and in each booth they served us a kilo-size portion of potatoes.
In quite a number of these booths they had made an effort to prepare
the potatoes in a special way.
-(21b) has a measure interpretation. I ate a three kilo-size portion of
potatoes: it consisted of four very big potatoes, and 10 tiny blue-green
ones. The latter tasted, well, peculiar.
Actually, note that (21b) can be used to express that individual pota-
toes had a pleasant taste: it is not required that potatoes itself shifts to
mass.
Rothstein’s example (22) is also instructive:
(22) a. #Each of the six boxes of books that I read had more than
300 pages.
b. ØMuch of the six boxes of books that I brought could have
stayed at home.
The VP in (22) forces reference to books rather than boxes, since boxes
don’t have pages. Only a measure interpretation accesses books, since
portions of books don’t have pages either. Each is incompatible with
the measure reading, so (22a) is infelicitous. But (22b) is perfectly
fine, and has a measure interpretation whereby the totality books is
compared in terms of the measure boxful.
What this means is that ’the very same thing’ may count as much
of the six boxes of ball bearings, which is mass, and as many of the ball
bearings, which is count. In Iceberg semantics, the difference is located
in the base: the base of the first, but not that of the second involves the
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measure boxful in its derivation.
2.5. Semantics of portion classifiers
2.5.1. Shape classifiers
The Iceberg semantics of shape classifiers like hunk, slice, heap,
strand,. . . is straightforward. Shape classifiers are portion classifiers
based on count nouns. As functions from i-sets to i-sets the semantics
expressed by their body is just intersection:
count noun: hunk→ <HUNKw,t, HUNKw,t>, with HUNKw,t disjoint.
Shape classifier interpretation:
bodyP = λx. body(P)(x) ∧ HUNKw,t(x)
The stuff that is body(P) and hunk.
We feed the portion interpretation for hunk into the classifier interpre-
tation schema of section 2.2, apply to the interpretation of meat, and
derive (after simplification):
hunk of meat→ <base, base >
base = λx.MEATw,t(x) ∧ HUNKw,t(x)
The stuff that is meat and hunk.
Since shape classifiers are based on count nouns, the base derived for
hunk of meat is disjoint, so we derive for shape classifiers the same fact
as for container classifiers:
fact: hunk of meat with hunk a shape portion classifier is a singular
count NP.
Actually, shape classifiers satisfy a stronger property:
Contextual separateness:
If HUNKw,t(x) and HUNKw,t(y) and x 6= y, then x and y are contextually
separated:




What I mean by this is that two disjoint parts of one hunk of meat only
become themselves hunks when they are cut and we can pick them up
separately. Similarly, two disjoint parts of the soup become portions
of soup when we put them in separate bowls. And two segments of
one hair are not two strands of hair, strands of hair are hairs, complete
objects. Defining the notion of contextual separation goes beyond the
scope of this paper. It relates to the topological considerations in the
semantics of mass and count nouns in Grimm (2012) (though separat-
edness is more than topological apartness: two slices of meat lying op top of
each other are separate slices, but not topologically apart).
2.5.2. Contents classifiers
Above, we analyzed the container reading of three glasses of wine: three
glasses containing wine. In this section we are concerned with the con-
tents reading: wine contained in three glasses. This reading is a portion
reading, which, as is clear from this informal description, involves the
converse of the containment relation (to be defined with the contents
function). Central in the analysis of contents readings is a presupposi-
tion that the function contents is normal on relevant indices w,t, in the
following sense:
Normality of contents:
content[GLASS,WINE,c] is normal on w,t iff if GLASSw,t(x) and GLASSw,t(y)
and x 6= y
then content[GLASS,WINE,c]w,t(x) and content[GLASS,WINE,c]w,t(y) are dis-
joint.
A consequence of normality is that in normal contexts the function con-
tentsw,t is one-one, and hence the inverse function contentsw,t
–1 is de-
fined.
In section 2.3 the container classifier interpretation of glass was de-
rived directly from the interpretation of the noun glass. For the contents
interpretation, we shift the interpretation of the noun glass from a set
of containers to the set of portions that are the contents of those con-
tainers:
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Contents interpretation of NP glass:
[NP glass ]→ <base, base>
base = λx.GLASSw,t(contentsw,t
–1(x))
The set of portions that are contents in w,t of glasses.
It is this NP-interpretation of glass that enters into the classifier interpre-
tation schema. As promised above, for contents classifiers we specify
an additional presupposition on the classifier interpretation schema:
presP = contents is normal on the context.
Under this presupposition, the schema derives the following body:
Contents classifier interpretation:
bodyP = λx. body(P)(x) ∧ GLASSw,t(contentsw,t
–1(x))
The set of body(P) portions that are contents in w,t of glasses.
We apply to the interpretation of wine and derive:
glass of wine→ <base, base>
base = λx.WINEw,t(x) ∧ GLASSw,t(contentsw,t
–1(x))
The set of wine portions that are glass-contents in w,t.
Now we argue as follows.
Let x, y ∈ base and let x 6= y.
Then contentsw,t
–1(x) 6= contentsw,t
–1(y), simply because contentsw,t
is a function.
So x and y are the contents in w,t of different glasses. It follows now
from the normality presupposition that portions of wine x and y are
disjoint. Hence we have derived, also for contents portion classifiers:




2.6. Semantics for measures
2.6.1. Measure functions
Measure functions are functions from B into the set of non-negative real
numbers (R+), where the null-object in B is mapped onto 0. In general:
Measure functions:
µw,t: B→ R
+ ∪ {⊥} where µw,t(0) = 0
Definedness:
def(µw,t(x)) iff µw,t(x) 6=⊥
In the context of natural language measures we cannot ignore the pos-
sibility that objects with defined measure values have parts whose mea-
sure value is not defined. For instance, the measure broadloom meter
measures the length of carpet with a standard width of 3.66 meter. A
role of carpet has a defined broadloom meter value, but this value is
measured along one side of the roll, hence, only parts that go from that
side across the roll have themselves a defined broadloom meter values.
I will be concerned here with additive continuous measure functions,
like the measure functions for volume and weight. Additivity is the
following principles:
Additivity:
If X is a countable disjoint subset of B and for every x ∈ X:
def(µw,t(x)),
then µw,t(⊔X) = Σ(µw,t(x): x ∈ X}
This entails, for x and y such that def(µw,t(x – y)), def(µw,t(y – x)) and
def(µw,t(x ⊓ y)):
µw,t(x ⊔ y) = µw,t(x – y) + µw,t(y – x) + µw,t(x ⊓ y)
I will presuppose a standard definition of continuity for measure func-
tions, which entails the Intermediate Value Theorem:
Intermediate Value Theorem:
If x ⊑ y and µw,t(x) < µw,t(y) then for every r ∈ R
+:
if µw,t(x) < r < µw,t (y) then ∃z ∈ B: x ⊑ z ⊑ y and µw,t(z)
= r
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Take volume as an example: continuity entails that when a body grows
from x with defined volume µw,t(x) to y with defined volume µw,t(y),
its volume passes through all intermediate values. The intermediate
value theorem tells us that we do not let undefinedness interfere with
continuity. Take once again the measure broadloom meter: when we
measure the carpet roll along the defined dimension, the measure val-
ues increase through all real numbers from 0 to the broadloom value
of the carpet roll: we do not go through undefined values when we
measure parts of the roll along this dimension.
2.6.2. Measure i-sets: additive continuous measures are mass
A measure function µw,t is, of course, a set of pairs of objects in B and
values in B+ ∪ {⊥}:
µw,t= {<b, µw,t(b)>: b ∈ B} ⊆ B × (R
+ ∪ {⊥})
I propose to use this view of the measure function as a set of pairs to
extend Iceberg semantics to measures: we generalize the notion i-set
to measure i-set:
measure i-sets: Given measure function µwt.
A (µwt) measure i-set is a pair <body, base>, where body
and base are sets of object-µw,t value pairs, and the base
generates the body under sum.
The notion generated under sum means that we need to impose a Boolean
structure onto the set of pairs of object-measure values. Since every ob-
ject in B has a value under µw,t in R
+ ∪ {⊥}, lifting the Boolean structure
from B to µw,t is lifting the structure in a trivial way to D × (R
+ ∪ {⊥}):
Bµ,w,t = {<b, µw,t(b)>: b ∈ B}
<x,µw,t(x)> ⊑ Bµw,t <y,µw,t(y)> iff × ⊑B y
<x, µw,t(x)> ⊔Bµw,t <y, µw,t(y)> = <x ⊔B y, µw,t(x ⊔ y)>
The Boolean algebra Bµ,w,t is clearly isomorphic to B (since the measure
part plays no role in the definitions).
We now interpret measure liter as a measure i-set, with body the
additive continuous volume measure function literw,t:
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[measure liter ]→ LITER w,t = <body(LITERw,t), base(LITERw,t)> with:
1.body(LITERw,t) = literw,t
2. base(literw,t) ⊆ literw,t and base(literw,t) generates literw,t
under ⊔Bµ,w,t
We now argue:
Fact: If µw,t is an additive continuous measure function, < µw,t, base>
is a measure i-set, and the base is disjoint, then the base can only
contain pairs of the form <x,0> or <x,⊥>
Proof: Let µw,t be an additive continuous measure function, < µw,t,
base> a measure i-set,
base disjoint and µw,t(x) > 0 and <x,µw,t(x)> ∈ base.
Then 0 ⊑ x and µw,t(0) < µw,t(x). Let 0 < r < µw,t(x). By the
Intermediate Value Theorem, there is a y such that 0 ⊑ y ⊑ x and
µw,t(y) = r.
Then <y, µw,t(y)> is generated by base, i.e. µw,t(y) ∈ *base.
But obviously, since y is a proper part of x, <y, µw,t(y)> can only
be generated from pairs<z, µw,t(z)> ∈ base, with z a proper part
of x. This means that base is not disjoint.
Hence, if base cannot it cannot contain pairs of the form <x,r>,
with r >0.
Does this show that the base of additive continuous measures cannot
be disjoint? Not quite by itself, because the theory does not disallow
infinitesimal point objects.
Think of models for space and time. As is well know, we can rep-
resent real time intervals and real space solids as infinite sets of point,
regular open sets of points. If we include the points in our model they
are disjoint, and in defining measure functions for space and time we
set the measure values of the points to 0 (or ⊥). Regular open sets of
points get positive real measure values. If we generalize this picture
from space to matter, and allow infinitesimal disjoint matter points, we
could let the bases consist of matter points and generate all measure
values from a disjoint base of points.
But note, these would not be points of time, space or space-time, but
points of matter, which can be seen as an extreme version of Demokritos’
Vol. 11: Number: Cognitive, Semantic and Crosslinguistic Approaches
37 Fred Landman
theory of atoms. Such points of matter have, of course, no physical
reality: while space may be made up of space points, I will not accept
that similarly wine is made up of wine points. This really is an extension
of the arguments in Landman (2011) against ’homeopathic semantics’:
salt worth one salt molecule is mass noun phrase. Iceberg semantics
does not accept that, because of the mass nature of the noun phrase, the
objects in its denotation must split into proper parts that are themselves
in the denotation of salt (i.e. that it is salt all the way down). Similarly,
Iceberg semantics does not accept that salt is built from salt-points:
Iceberg semantics:
Try to develop the semantics of mass nouns and count nouns
in naturalistic structures. Try not to disregard natural parts
and structure. Try not to include non-natural. structure.
[Note: This semantic naturalism does not, in my view, extend to fundamental
ontological notions of when an object counts as ’one’, where an object begins
and ends, etc. I argued already in Landman (1992) for events that, as far as
grammar is concerned, the latter notions are contextual and pragmatically ma-
nipulated, so naturalistic parsimony is not necessarily appropriate there. I will
discuss these matters in the context of the semantics of mass and count nouns
in Landman (2017), projected.]
So I add to the technical theory an Icebergian axiom of faith:
Iceberg Dogma: Iceberg semantics rejects points of matter.
With this we conclude:
Corollary: Continuous additive measures are interpreted as
mess mass measure
i-sets: measure i-sets with an overlapping base.
In other words: measures are mass.
So what is base(LITERw,t)?
Intuitively, in Iceberg semantics the base contains the ’contextually
minimal’ stuff that the body is made of. The above discussion suggests
that for measure functions, the generating base must be a set that is
closed under parts. Since measures are extensional, it is natural to think
of the base as the set of all part-measure value pairs whose measure
value is smaller than a certain value.
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Let mliter,w,t (m for short) be a contextually given measure value.
For concreteness think of m as the lowest volume that our experimen-
tal precision weighing scales can measure directly (rather than extrap-
olate).
literw,t
≤m = {<x, literw,t(x)>: literw,t(x) ≤ m }
The set of object-liter value pairs where the liter value is less than or
equal to m.
We set:
[measure liter ]→ < literw,t, literw,t
≤m >
literw,t
≤m is closed downward and hence a heavily overlapping base.
Since all pairs <d, literw,t > with literw,t(d) ≤ m are in literw,t
≤m,
literw,t
≤m has no problem generating all elements with higher volume
value as sums of base elements with ⊔B,literw,t: literw,t ⊆ *literw,t
≤m.
I summarize where we are. I made the standard assumption that
measure liter denotes an additive continuous measure function. I have
implemented this in the most literal way in Iceberg semantics: mea-
sure liter denotes a measure i-set: it satisfies the same requirement of
the body being generated under sum from the base as all other nomi-
nal expressions. I derived from that and from general concerns about
additive measure functions that measures are mass.
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2.6.3. The general measure interpretation schema
We add operations ↑ and ↓ that shift between sets of objects and sets of
object-measure value pairs in the obvious way:
For X ⊆ B: ↑X = {<x,literw,t(x)>: x ∈ X }
For Z ⊆ Bliter.w,t :
↓Z = {x ∈ B: <x, literw,t(x)> ∈ Z}
Further, as a last step on the way to the general measure interpretation
schema, it will be useful to introduce a mixed type of i-set, with the body
a set of objects, and the base a set of object-µwt value pairs: measure
i↓-sets:
Given measure function µw.t.
A (µw.t ) measure i
↓-set is a pair <body, base>, where the
body is a set of objects and the base is a set of object-µwt
value pairs and ↓base generates the body under ⊔.
What will happen is the following. The measure liter denotes a
measure i-set, body and base are pairs of objects-literw,t values. The
measure phrase three liters of wine will denote a measure i↓-set: the
body denotes a set of objects, but the base still denotes a set of object-
literw,t values. This assumption allows us to keep track of the relevant
part of the measure function in the derivation, up to the level where,
say, in the partitive measure phrases of section 2.4.2 like much of the
twenty kilos of potatoes, we want much to access the measure function.












(three ◦ liter) ∩ wine
Syntax and semantics are mismatched: three liter is a semantic




We have so far interpreted measure liter as LITERw,t, a measure i-set.
But this measure i-set needs to shift to a function, measure(LITERw,t),
which can fulfil the grammatical functions: it should compose with the
interpretation of number predicate three, and intersect the result with
the interpretation of wine.
Given what was said above, we assume: measure(α) shifts measure
i-set α to a function from number sets and measure i-sets to measure
i↓-sets.
General measure interpretation schema:
[Let P be a variable over i-sets N over sets of numbers,
α a measure i-set.]
[I have left potential further presuppositions out of the schema for simplic-
ity.]
We apply the general measure schema to measure liter, number
predicate three, and NP[–plur] wine, and we derive:
three liters of wine→ <body, base>
body = λx.literw,t(x)=3 ∧ WINEw,t (x)
The wine that has volume three liters.
base = {<y, literw,t(y)>: literw,t(y )≤ m ∧ ∃x[WINEw,t (x) ∧ y ⊑ x]}
↓base = ↓mliter,w,t
≤ ∩ λy.∃x[WINEw,t (x) ∧ y ⊑ x]
The stuff that is part of the wine and has volume at most m.
We derive the following fact:
Fact: Measure phrase three liters of wine is a mass NP.
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Since mliter,w,t
≤ is not disjoint, neither is ↓mliter,w,t
≤ (which isλy. literw,t(y
)≤ m).
Obviously, then, (in the normal case) the intersection is not going to be
disjoint either.
We derive a similar semantics for three kilos of potatoes with stan-
dard additive weight function kilow,t, and three boxes of books with non-
standard measure function boxw,t:
three kilos of potatoes: λx.kilow,t(x)=3 ∧ *POTATOw,t(x)
three boxes of books: λx.boxw,t(x)=3 ∧ *BOOKw,t(x)
Three kilos of potatoes is mass, because the base that we derive (given
a similar choice of base for the measure as for liter) is the set of potato-
parts that measure up to value mkilo, and this set is not disjoint.
It is important to note that the elements of ↓base for three kilos of
potatoes are Boolean parts of the sum of potatoes involved: they are
not themselves required to be potatoes or sums of potatoes (in the de-
notation *POTATOw,t of plural noun potatoes). At the same time, on a
non-shifted interpretation, the elements of the body are in *POTATO,
i.e. without shifting they are sums of potatoes, not just potato mass. A
nice example showing this effect concerns the Dutch count noun bonbon
in (23):
(23) [at Neuhaus in the Galerie de la Reine in Brussels]
Customer: Ik wou graag 500 gram bonbons.
I would like 500 grams of pralines.
Shop assistant: Eén meer or één minder?
One more or one less?
The shift Ah, just squeeze enough into the box so that it weighs exactly
500 grams would be a faux pas at this particular location.
2.7. Shifting measures to classifiers
Khrizman et al. (2015), in their discussion of the count nature of portion
interpretation, discuss various operations that shift measures to portion
classifiers, and argue that the interpretations derived are count. I will
briefly sketch these shifts here.
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In all the following cases we derive λP.<baseP,baseP>, with baseP
disjoint.
Case 1: Shift the measure to a container interpretation.
This is what we saw in example (7) and what we see in example (24):
(24) I broke a liter of milk
We assume property CONTAINERc that maps index w,t onto disjoint set
CONTAINERc,w,t, a set of containers at w,t whose nature is determined
by context c.
We shift measure LITERw,t to singular count i-set one liter container
which feeds into the classifier interpretation schema. The composi-
tional details are given in Khrizman et al. (2015). We derive the fol-
lowing base:
baseP = λx.CONTAINERc ,w,t(x) ∧ body(P)(contentsw,t(x)) ∧
literw,t(contentsw,t(x))=1
The set of containers containing one liter of body(P).
This is, of course a disjoint set (because CONTAINERc,w,t is disjoint).
liter of milk→ <base, base>
base = λx.CONTAINERc,w,t(x) ∧ MILKw,t(contentsw,t(x)) ∧
literw,t(contentsw,t(x))=1
With this, (24) expresses that I broke a one liter container of milk.
Case 2. Shift the measure to a portion interpretation: free portion inter-
pretations.
This is what we find in (25):
(25) He drank three liters of Soda pop, one in the morning, one in
the afternoon, one in the evening.
Here the protagonist drank three portions of Soda pop, of one liter each.
In analogy to the previous case, we assume a property PORTIONc that
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maps index w,t onto disjoint set PORTIONc ,w,t, a set of portions at w,t
whose nature is determined by context c.
We shift measure LITERw,t to singular count i-set one liter portion,
which feeds into the classifier interpretation schema. The composi-
tional details are the same as for container shift. We derive the fol-
lowing base:
baseP = λx. PORTIONc ,w,t(x) ∧ body(P)(x) ∧ literw,t(x)=1
The set of one liter portions of body(P).
Again this is disjoint set (because PORTIONc ,w,t is disjoint).
liter of Soda pop→ <base, base>
base = λx. PORTIONc ,w,t(x) ∧ SODA POPw,t(x) ∧ literw,t(x)=1
With this, (25) expresses that he drank three disjoint one liter portions
of soda pop.
Case 3: Free portions interpretations for container classifiers
We have seen above that container classifiers like bottle, glass, cup,
box can have measure interpretations. We assume that these inter-
pretations involve non-standard measure functions: bottlew,t, glassw,t,
cupw,t, boxw,t. The measure function cupw,t fixes a volume that count
as the contents of ’one cup’ (US: 1 cup = 0.236588 liters [γ]).
Now, under case 2 we shifted standard measure liter to a portion
classifier. With that we may well expect that we can, with the same
operation, shift the non-standard measure interpretation of container
classifiers to portion classifiers as well: Thus as a measure, cup is inter-
preted as a measure i-set based on measure function cupw,t. With the
portion shift operation of case 2, we shift this to portion classifier one
cup portion. We derive the following base:
baseP = λx. PORTIONc ,w,t(x) ∧ body(P)(x) ∧ cupw,t(x)=1
The set of one-cup size portions of body(P)
cup of Soy sauce→ <base, base>
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base = λx. PORTIONc ,w,t(x) ∧ SOY SAUCEw,t(x) ∧ cupw,t(x)=1
Look at (26):
(26) Pour three cups of soy sauce in the brew, the first after 5 minutes,
the second after 10 minutes, the third after 15 minutes. I have
a good eye and a very steady hand, so I pour them straight
from the bottle.
As usual, the relevant reading of three cups of soy sauce in (26) is not
a container classifier reading: I don’t add the cups to the brew. The
relevant reading is not a contents classifier reading either: the soy sauce
is never in a cup when I pour, the portions of soy sauce in question
are not the contents of any container in CUPw,t. The reading is not a
measure reading either, because I count what I pour in: one cup-size
portions. This is the free portions interpretation: portions that are tied
to the measure function cupw,t, not to cups.
2.8. In sum
We have derived the following readings for classifiers and measures:
three glasses of wine:
container: three glasses filled with wine count
contents: three portions of wine, each the contents of a glass count
measure: wine to the amount of three glassfuls mass
portion: three one glassful size portions of wine count
three liters of wine:
measure: wine to the amount of three liters mass
portion: three one liter size portions of wine count
container: three one liter containers filled with wine count




The above is a systematic account of the different interpretations of clas-
sifier and measure phrases and their mass-count characteristics. This
becomes possible in Iceberg semantics, because the mass-count distinc-
tion does not just apply to lexical nouns, but to noun phrases in general,
and because of the Head principle, which gives a compositional defini-
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tion of bases for complex noun phrases.
Of course, anybody can postulate an uninterpreted feature system
for mass-count, and extend it to complex noun phrases. But, when it
comes to portion readings and Rothstein’s observation about the mass
nature of measure phrases, an uninterpreted feature system will be stip-
ulative and uninsightful. As we have seen, I think Rothstein’s own stip-
ulation that derives the mass nature of measure phrases is problematic
as well.
The present paper derives the mass nature of measure phrases from
general principles of Iceberg semantics (bases generate bodies under
sum) and from a detailed analysis of the nature of bases for measures.
This account is not only non-trivial, but the argumentation involved
has, I think, enormous potential for the semantics analysis of prototyp-
ical mess mass nouns as well.
The Problem of Portions.
Mountain semantics suffered from the Problem of Portions. Iceberg se-
mantics replaces atomicity by disjointness. Removing atoms, and char-
acterizing mass-count in terms of bases, means that the same wine can





The basic format of Iceberg semantics was presented, in the context of
the semantics of mass nouns, in Landman (2011). The compositional
theory was presented at the Workshop on Countability at the Heinrich
Heine University in Düsseldorf in 2013 (see also Landman 2016). How-
ever, the basic idea of Icebergs was planted in my head long before
that by Barbara Partee, who at many times expressed to me that in her
opinion, atomicity is peripheral to Link’s theory, the core being plural
denotations being understood as grounded in singular ones. I am very
grateful to Barbara for continuing to insist on this: in the end, working
on mass nouns convinced me that the idea was right, though I continue
to hold that atomicity is the core of Link’s theory, and though working
out Barbara’s intuition turned out to be harder than either of us might
have expected.
The Düsseldorf Workshop really worked as a catalyst for me, and I
thank the organizers, Hana Filip and Christian Horn, and the partici-
pants, especially Scott Grimm and Manfred Krifka, for their stimulating
presence and discussion.
The work for this paper got into grand rapids when Susan Roth-
stein and I both received Humboldt Research Awards and descended
onto the University of Tübingen for one and a half years of research in
February 2015. I thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for
this wonderful opportunity, and Gerhard Jäger, Fritz Hamm and Heike
Winhart at the University of Tübingen for their much appreciated help
in building a temporary academic living.
Since coming to Tübingen I have presented versions of this paper at
the Eberhard Karls University Tübingen, the Heinrich Heine University
in Düsseldorf, the Goethe University of Frankfurt, the Humboldt Uni-
versity of Berlin and the University of Stuttgart. I warmly thank all the
audiences for their comments.
The material in Khrizman et al. (2015), which was presented at the
20th Amsterdam Colloquium, overlaps with some of the material in this
paper. Working on that paper helped enormously to clarify some of the
issues in the present paper. So: warm thanks to my co-authors Keren
Khrizman, Suzi Lima, Susan Rothstein and Brigitta R. Schvarcz.
I presented Iceberg semantics in two lectures at the 7th Interna-
tional School in Cognitive Sciences and Semantics, at the University of
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Latvia, in Riga, December 2015, and I presented the present paper at
the 11th International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communi-
cation, which followed right after the School. I thank the organizers of
the School and the Symposium, Jurǧis Šķilters and Susan Rothstein, my
fellow teachers at the winter school, Scott Grimm, Daniel Hyde, Suzi
Lima and Susan Rothstein, the students and participants, in particu-
lar Hana Filip and Peter Sutton, for their comments, and for creating
a wonderfully pleasant and stimulating environment. More thanks to
Peter for comments on the written version of the paper.
Finally, a version of the material in section 2.6 was presented at a
second workshop on Countability in Düsseldorf, once again organized
by Hanna Filip, with almost the same participants as the Riga workshop
- thanks to them all again, and to Beth Levin.
Though she has been mentioned already several times in these ac-
knowledgements, I will bring to the fore once more Susan Rothstein:
the fact that Susan was writing a book on counting and measuring
while I was developing this material did not always make life easy
and unstressed for either of us. But the continuous engagement with
each other’s work has enriched my work on Iceberg semantics and the
present paper without measure.
[γ]-LIST. ALL ITEMS ACCESSED IN 2015-2016.
(7) Matilda Koen-Sarano, 2003, Folktales of Joha. Jewish trickster. Translated by
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